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Abstract 
Road transportation networks are a segment of society’s critical infrastructure 
particularly susceptible to service disruptions. Traffic incidents disrupt road networks by 
producing blockages and increasing travel times, creating significant impacts during 
emergency events such as evacuations. For this reason, it is extremely important to 
incorporate traffic incidents in evacuation planning models. Emergency managers and 
decision makers need tools that enable rapid assessment of multiple, varied scenarios. 
Many evacuation simulations require high-fidelity data input making them impractical for 
rapid deployment by practitioners. Since there is such variation in evacuation types and 
the method of disruption, evacuation models do not require the high-fidelity data needed 
by other types of transportation models. This paper’s purpose is to show that decision 
makers can gain useful information from rapid evacuation modeling which includes a 
simple traffic incident model. To achieve this purpose, the research team integrated a 
generic incident model into the Real-time Evacuation Planning Model (RtePM), a tool 
commissioned by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to help emergency planners 
determine regional evacuation clearance times in the United States. RtePM is a simple, 
web-based tool that enables emergency planners to consider multiple evacuation plans at 
no additional cost to the user. Using this tool, we analyzed a simple scenario of the 
United States’ National Capital Region (NCR) to determine the impact of traffic incidents 
when different destination routes are blocked. The results indicate significant variations 
in evacuation duration when blockages are considered. 
 




A road transportation network is a critical infrastructure, albeit one that is frequently 
and easily disrupted. Traffic incidents create blockages and increased vehicle travel times; 
this impact is an important consideration for emergency events such as evacuations. A 
traffic incident is defined as any disruptive event that happens on, or nearby, a road 
facility [1]. Incidents include traffic accidents and other types of events such as stalls, 
debris, and road-kills. Given the disruptive nature of these events, there is a need to 
incorporate the impacts of incidents within evacuation planning models. Traditional 
transportation modelers use extensive data collected from the road facility of interest, 
rather than generic incident models. This preference comes from the desire to incorporate 
the large magnitude of factors that can influence the incident rate on road facilities. In 
addition to the cost and time required to collect incident data, evacuations are time-
compressed events of high activity and a multitude of perturbing influences with no 
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“average” conditions. Evacuation simulations often do not require the same degree of 
high-fidelity data used in other transportation applications. Thus, there is a demand, by 
emergency management planers, for a generic incident models to conduct rapid analysis 
of evacuation scenarios.  
This paper describes this demand for an evacuation simulation that incorporates a 
simple traffic incident model. This tool would enable a decision maker to rapidly create 
and run multiple variations of an evacuation area scenario that takes into account the 
impact of traffic incidents. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that useful 
information can be obtained from such rapid analysis. To achieve this purpose, the 
researchers adapted an existing evacuation simulation, Real-time Evacuation Planning 
Model (RtePM), to include a generic incident model so that a case-study evacuation 
scenario could analyzed. RtePM is a tool developed for the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security to help emergency planners determine the evacuation time required to clear user-
defined regions in the United States. RtePM is a simple, free, web-based tool that allows 
emergency planners to consider multiple options for evacuation plans 
(www.rtepm.vmasc.odu.edu). 
The Washington, D.C., evacuation scenario was used to investigate the compound 
effects of traffic incidents and random evacuation route closures. Thus multiple scenarios 
had to be constructed which would have been extremely time-consuming for existing 
simulation approaches. These evacuation route closures represent failures in the other 
critical infrastructure systems, e.g., downed power lines, gas leaks, dam breaches, or 
nuclear power station exclusion zones due to reactor breach.  
The paper begins with justifying the motivation for conducting rapid simulation 
analysis of evacuation scenarios. This is followed by a description of the generic incident 
model and the scenario. Results are displayed and discussed. Finally, validation and 
conclusions are provided. 
 
2. Motivation 
Extant traffic incident models tend to focus on specific traffic incident attributes rather 
than developing a holistic incident model [2-4] . This modern aversion to holistic models 
derives from the work of Ceder and Livneh [5] who criticize attempts to use accidents-
per-vehicle-kilometer as the sole analytical tool to assess the effectiveness of road 
improvements. The criticism appears to reflect the effects of traffic density/congestion 
represented as Average Daily Traffic influence. However, not all traffic incident models 
are used for determining road improvements; incorporating incidents provide significant 
value in other contexts, for example, determining random effects on an evacuation’s 
duration. The traffic incident model used in this paper considers only one factor for 
determining incident occurrence rates: the Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT). By 
considering a singular factor, this model provides decision-makers with a fast and simple 
tool to approximate the impacts of incident rates without collecting vast amounts of data. 
With such an obvious application gap, why has this method not been developed already? 
The reason that a simple generic traffic incident tool does not already exist within the 
literature is due to the different cultures of the transportation research community and the 
emergency management community. 
 
2.1. Cultures of Transportation and Emergency Management 
Many transportation models are used to assess the viability of developing or extending 
existing transportation networks; as such, they require a high level of resolution to be fit 
for purpose and to be credible within the transportation community. Credibility is the 
willingness of a community to accept a simulation as fit for its purpose, whereas 
validation is a simulation’s fitness for purpose [6]. The United States transportation 
community’s preference for detailed models is evidenced in the development of the 
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Highway Capacity Manual (HCM) which, in 37 chapters, delineates the data requirements 
and expected modeling processes for a variety of modeling situations to ensure credibility 
and validity [7]. The HCM is very appropriate for many transportation planning and 
management situations, such as development and facilities planning. There are, however, 
limitations on the extent to which the HCM is relevant to larger planning models. In 
particular, the HCM dictates that traffic incident models be based on data from the road 
facility or segment of interest; for larger, regional evacuation models that reflect rare 
events, data collection of this type and scope is extremely difficult. As the scenario 
considered in this paper has nearly 10,000 road segments even if the data were readily 
available this implementation would be impractical. Though non-United States modelers 
are not beholden to the HCM, they will be beholden to equivalent standards in their own 
country. 
With the emergency management community’s focus on rare events and short 
timelines for analysis, the culture, viewpoints, and priorities differ from those in the 
transportation community. An emergency manager must be a “jack of all trades” and 
make decisions based on the models and data readily available. So what happens when the 
cultures of transportation and emergency management collide in evacuation modeling? A 
void appears when existing transportation models are too complex for the needs of 
emergency managers but the fit-for-purpose models are deemed too simple by the 
transportation community. In some ways, this difference in cultures is reminiscent of the 
current clash occurring in the Decision Science / Operations Research domain where 
practitioners require the “80% solution” while academics produce more and more 
complex models [8]. 
 
2.2. Existing Evacuation Simulations 
The development of evacuation simulations is quite mature with many potential 
platforms available from research centers (University of Florida’s CORSIM, Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory’s OREMS, and TRANSIMS etc.) and commercial vendors (RST 
International’s DynusT, KLD Engineering’s Dynev, Citilabs®  CUBE Avenue, Visual 
Solutions’ VISSIM, etc.). Government agencies around the world also have produced 
specialized simulations. Often, these models are designed for evacuations from a specific 
region and capable of better fidelity and accuracy than generic models, though this can be 
hard to assess. These models also require considerable resources to develop. The 
constraints on access, generalizability, and data requirements prompted the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security to commission an application that meets the planning 
needs of disaster and emergency managers throughout the country. This project 
culminated in the development of the Real-time Evacuation Planning Model or “RtePM.” 
Unlike a bespoke simulation, RtePM utilizes US Census and proprietary road network 
data to enable disaster and emergency management planners to evaluate quickly any 
region of the US with minimum data entry requirements. The application requires little to 
no technical expertise of users to develop and run simulation models. The subject matter 
expertise of local emergency managers can be used to tailor the simulation to reflect 
specific characteristics of the investigation area. For its accessibility to the general 
emergency management and transportation communities, as well as flexibility in 
adaptation to differing evacuation environments, in this paper, RtePM is the tool used to 
the benefits of a simple evacuation model for decision-makers that incorporates accident 
and incidents. 
Though the current scope of RtePM is restricted to the U.S., the principles of the 
software application are generalizable to other countries as well. European evacuation 
models such as those in Rotterdam in The Netherlands [9], Istanbul in Turkey [10] or 
Lancaster in the United Kingdom [11] suffer from the same gap as those studies from the 
US discussed above. This is likely due to the dominance of academic evacuation literature 
generated in United States. For example, Galindo and Batta [12] found that, when doing a 
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review of disaster Operational Research, 80 of the 104 papers they found that were from 
the US-based Transportation Research Record (TRR) rather than Operational Research / 
Management Science journals were from the Transportation Research Record (TRR), the 
journal of the United States’ transportation research funding body: the Transportation 
Research Board (TRB). The current preponderance of US influence in evacuation 
research, however, does not reflect the applicability of rapid emergency simulations in 
other global contexts. 
It should be noted that not all emergency evacuation models use simulation or even 
consider vehicles. Liu et al., [13] and Chen and Xiao [14] used linear programming to 
evacuation route rerouting; Wang et al., [15] used systems dynamics to explore the spread 
of panic in evacuations; and qualitative studies of evacuees’ decision processes was 




Modern day traffic incident modeling originated with Ceder and Livneh [20, 21] who 
advocated against using simple models for road-improvement planning purposes. Most 
evacuation simulations, however, focus on determining the evacuation duration for a 
particular scenario rather than road improvement. For this reason, it is important to 
reconsider the value of simplistic models. At its most basic level, a traffic incident model 
that is useful in evacuation simulations must include two vital elements: incident 
occurrence rate and incident impact on travel-times. While there are a variety of other 
factors that could affect the rate of traffic incidents, e.g., road curvature, weather 
condition, human factors, a survey of the evacuation research yields little insight into the 
development of an effective, quick-use tool for practitioners [22]. The impact of these 
factors on travel-time does not need to be modeled explicitly within the simulation but 
can be represented through other effects such as degradation of the transportation network 
due to the traffic incident. The traffic incident model, described shortly, incorporates 
incident occurrence rate and incident impact on travel-times applied to each road segment 
of the scenario at each time-step. 
To keep the model as simple and generalizable as possible, the incident occurrence rate 
only considers one factor, the Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) on each individual road 
segment throughout the modeled network. The VMT are the total miles traveled by all 
vehicles on a particular road segment for a given time-step, in this case one hour. 
Caliendo et al., [23] concluded that traffic flow, related to VMT, was the second most 
significant factor in determining incident rate. Human factors the most significant. 
Incident frequency increases with increased VMT. A faster moving road segment will 
experience a higher number of VMT as a higher rate of vehicles moves through it in the 
time-step. A slow-moving congested road segment will also experience a high number of 
VMT due to the large number of cars on it. The form of the incident occurrence rate is 
given as: 
 
P(incident in VMT)=1- P(no incident in VMT) 
P(incident in VMT)=1- (1-p)VMT               (1) 
 
The traffic incident model only allows one incident per road segment per time-step; the 
form of equation (1) takes into account the possibility of multiple traffic incidents on a 
road segment and combines them into a single probability for one traffic incident. The 
probability of incident ‘p’ is 0.00001 or one incident per 100,000 VMT. This number was 
derived from a number of national U.S. data sources including National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) National Center for Statistics and Analysis [24], which 
estimates that 2.957 billion VMT were traveled in the United States in 2009, and U.S. 
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Census Bureau [25], which estimated the number of accidents to have occurred in the US 
in 2009 is approximately 10,800,000. The values are educated estimates as complete data 
of this magnitude is impossible to collected; specifically, only about half of all traffic 
accidents are reported [26, 27]. 
A generic incident model must consider all types of incidents, not just accidents, in 
order to understand the impact of incidents on travel times. There are limited data 
available for non-accident incidents and, as such, the Highway Capacity Manual 
advocates in Exhibit 36-2 “General Data Categories Required for a Reliability Evaluation” 
[7] the use of crash rate and incident-to-crash ratio for the facility to determine the 
incident rate. Unfortunately, no widely accepted incident-to-crash ratio exists. One 
example in the Highway Capacity Manual [7] determined the ratio to be seven; that is, for 
every reported accident there were seven incidents (including the accident). This ratio 
came from a 5-year study of a 12.5-mile stretch on I-40E. In a study the four-county 
metro Atlanta area for 2009 by the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT), the 
ratio was only five [28]. In both cases, the ratio was based on reported accidents, thus the 
ratio is halved in the model when considering both reported and unreported accidents, e.g., 
2.5 and 3.5. More details about our generic incident model are given in Collins et al., [22] 
and validation is discussed in Collins et al., [29]. 
The project team derived the generic incident model from data obtained from normal 
traffic conditions. It is likely that conditions will be significantly different in evacuation 
scenarios. However, the authors contest that accurate data about traffic accident rates in 
an emergency evacuation scenario will never be collected because there are higher 
priorities for emergency services to consider, i.e., getting people out of the danger zone. 
Hence, it must be accepted that an approximate approach must be used. This argument 
also provides justification for not using convoluted traffic incident models for emergency 
evacuation scenarios because though those convoluted models might make estimates that 
are more accurate but these estimates are based on assumptions from a different scenario, 
i.e., driving under normal conditions. 
 
3.1. Impact of Incidents 
Evaluating evacuation duration is often the purpose of an evacuation simulation; thus 
the impact of traffic incidents on a given road segment is the primary area of inquiry for 
this study. Our simple traffic incident model reduces the number of lanes open and 
reduces the speed of the vehicles on that road segment for the duration of the incident. 
Considering these two factors aligns with the recommendations of the Highway Capacity 
Manual [7] which advocates using lane closures and a reduction in the capacity of the 
remaining open lanes to simulate the impact of an incident. The quantitative values used 
for these two factors was informed by a study from the Georgia Department of 
Transportation (GDOT) of the four-county metro Atlanta area in 2009 [28]. This data 
source is from only one type of road segment; however, with over 10,000 road segments 
in the scenario below, it would be extremely difficult and costly to produce traffic 
incident impacts for them all. The impact of incidents was compared to previous studies 
of Robinson et al. [30] and was found to have a similar impact on evacuation duration as 
the city of Virginia Beach, Virginia in the United States [22]. 
To understand how this two-part traffic incident model is implemented, we provide an 
overview of the incident/accident algorithm used in the model. At each time-step, the 
number of VMT is determined for a road segment and input into Equation (1) to 
determine if an incident occurred. If an incident did occur, then a random traffic incident 
type is determined from the incident impact model. The incident type determines the 
number of lanes to be closed and the duration. The simulated road segment’s 
characteristics are changed to reflect the effects of the road incident; specifically, the road 
capacity is reduced to reflect the reduction in available lanes. 
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3.2. Real-time Evacuation Planning Model (RtePM) 
Our generic traffic incident model is a combination of the incident occurrence rate 
model and incident impact model. This model was incorporated into the Real-Time 
Evacuation Planning Model (RtePM), a publicly available stochastic evacuation planning 
tool. A scenario was developed in RtePM to investigate the impacts of varying the 
number of evacuation routes available during an evacuation. 
RtePM is a micro-simulation traffic model with each individual vehicle represented in 
the simulation. RtePM is easy to use, allowing users to draw polygons on a map to 
determine the evacuation areas and road facilities available. Population and road network 
data is automatically drawn from United States Census and NAVTEQ data, thus 
minimizing data input requirements. Additional inputs supplied by regional evacuation 
subject matter experts further refine the model to reflect factors such as seasonal 
populations and varying evacuation response curve. RtePM is designed to run as fast as 
possible and, as such, employs simplification of certain computations, for example, the 
Origin-Destination matrix updates each simulated hour, evacuees are only released on the 
simulated hour, and there is no dynamic lane changing within the simulation. 
The traffic incident model was integrated within RtePM at the road segment level. At 
each simulated hour, the total number of VMT on each segment is calculated and used to 
determine if an incident had occurred on that segment during the last hour, if it did then 
the incident affect is applied to the next hour. For simplicity, no secondary traffic 
incidents were included, though it has been shown that there is positive probability they 
will occur [31]. 
The actual impact of a traffic incident within RtePM was the reduction of speed on the 
affected road segment for that simulated hour. A randomly selected incident type was 
selected and that type determined the speed reduction, which ranged from a 5% reduction 
to a 100% reduction. These reductions in speeds were calibrated using a combination of 
the data from the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT), of the 4-county metro 
Atlanta area for 2009, and the Highway Capacity Manual. The speed reduction allowed 
for the same impact to traffic volume and segment capacity as if actual lanes were closed. 
The calibration also took into account the difference between capacity due to the 
incident’s duration not being one hour. More details of this approach can be found in 
Collins et al., [22, 29]. 
When an incident occurs in RtePM, it affects a single segment. However, many traffic 
incidents happen on intersections thus affecting multiple segments. Due to the difficulties 
of automatically determining which road segments would be effected, a single incident 
does not affect multiple segments within RtePM. The authors accept that this is a 
weakness of the generic incident approach along with not including weather affects, road 
curvatures, etc. 
It is worth noting the simulated vehicles make re-routing choices each hour so if a 
vehicle is stuck in congestion they will potentially choose a different route. 
 
4. Scenario 
The studied scenario was a hypothetical evacuation of Washington, D.C, through the 
National Capital Region (NCR), including parts of the states of Virginia and Maryland. 
Possible reasons for such an evacuation could be terrorist threats, toxic material releases, 
or severe weather conditions, such as a hurricane. The evacuation is ordered in advance of 
a predicted adverse event. As such, the response duration is assumed to be eight hours 
following a truncated sigmoid-shaped response curve [32]. By considering a more 
controlled evacuation scenario, we avoid discussion on effects of panic and potential 
vehicle-abandonment. 
The evacuees are assumed to use only vehicular modes of transportation allowing the 
evacuees to travel a significant distance away. The model tracks the evacuees until they 
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reach specific destination end-points at the boundaries of user-defined safe areas. Upon 
reaching an endpoint, the individual vehicle evacuation is complete. The ten potential 
destination end-point nodes are shown in Figure 1; they relate to major arterial roads that 
lead away from Washington, D.C. The destination end-points are numbered 1 to 10 and 
relate to the (1) I-270 north-bound, (2) I-95 north-bound, (3) MD-295, (4) Martin Luther 
King Jr. Highway, (5) MD-4, (6) Branch Avenue, (7) Indian Head Highway, (8) I-95 
southbound, (9) I-66 west-bound, and (10) Dulles Airport access road. The availability of 
these destination end-points was varied to produce 35 variations of the scenario. 
The evacuation was of 339,000 vehicles representing the 848,000 night-time residents 
(based on the 2010 U.S. Census data) traveling at an average of 2.5 people per car [16]. 
RtePM is a micro-simulation so each individual vehicle is modeled. The transportation 
network that these evacuees travel over is made up of nearly 10,000 road segments. The 
road network is completely connected which allows for possible travel from any point to 
another in the network. The starting location of these evacuees is based on population 
census block groups and their destinations were among the ten destination nodes shown in 
Figure 1. The assignment of endpoints was based on the shortest travel times for the 




Figure 1. Screen-shot of RtePM showing the National Capital Region and 
the Considered Evacuation Area, Road Network and Labeled Destination 
Nodes 
Different scenario versions were constructed restricting access of the evacuees to some 
of the destination nodes. The 35 scenarios were grouped into four categories, which were: 
 All (one scenario): In this scenario all evacuation end-points were available at the 
start of the simulation. During a simulation run, some exit points might be blocked for 
a limited duration due to a severe traffic incident. This version of the scenario is 
considered the baseline for the all the simulations and has the shortest evacuation 
duration (10.5 hours without any incidents). 
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 Single Blocked Destination Node (ten scenarios): In these scenarios one of the ten 
destination nodes are blocked, this may be due to a number of reasons such as 
flooding or downed power line. It is assumed that the blocked destination node is not 
available for the duration of the evacuation. The scenarios are labeled ‘B1,’ ‘B2,’ etc. 
 Cardinal Directions (15 scenarios): These scenarios block an entire cardinal direction 
due to some major event, e.g., a leakage at a nuclear power plant. The destination 
nodes are divided among the four cardinal directions as show in Table 1. The 15 
scenarios are derived from the different combinations of closures of these cardinal 
directions, e.g., NES is the scenario when the north, east, and south destination nodes 
are open with the west exits closed. The study does not consider a scenario where all 
the cardinal directions are closed for obvious reasons. 
 Single Destination Node (ten scenarios): In these extreme scenarios, only one 
destination node is left opened for the evacuation. Though highly unlikely, these 
scenarios do provide a way to measure the usefulness of the different destination end-
points. These scenarios are labeled by number, e.g., ‘1.’ 
Table 1. Grouping of Destination Nodes into Cardinal Direction 
Cardinal Direction North East South West 
Related Destination nodes 1, 2, 3 4, 5 6, 7, 8 9, 10 
 
The exclusion (or inclusion) of some of the destination nodes allowed for an 
investigation into which are most effective at reducing the evacuation durations. This aids 
a decision maker faced with the choice to close one or more of the related road facilities. 
Due to the stochastic nature of the simulation, each of the scenarios was repeatedly run 
one hundred times: fifty times including the effects of incidents and fifty times without. 
Thus, a total of 3,500 (35 x100) simulation runs were completed. Due to other stochastic 
elements in the RtePM simulations, i.e., acceleration rates, following distance, total 
evacuating population, the simulations runs without traffic incidents involved varying 
factors, thus necessitating multiple simulations runs for statistical significance. 
Beyond the effects of each individual destination node being closed, the compounding 
effects of incidents on evacuation duration when limiting the number of destination nodes 
was of particular interest. In other words, do road traffic incidents have a greater effect on 
evacuation duration when there are less destination nodes available? A breakdown of the 
scenarios and their available destination nodes is given in Table 2. 
Table 2. Number of Scenarios which Contain a Certain Number of 
Destination Nodes (due to Excess Evacuation Times Seven Scenarios were 
Excluded from the Analysis and are shown in Grey) 
# Available Destination Nodes Scenarios # Scenarios 
1 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10  3 (10) 
2 E, W 2 
3 N, S 2 
4 EW 1 
5 NE, NW, SE, SW 4 
6 NS 1 
7 NEW, ESW 2 
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8 NES, NSW 2 
9 b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8, b9, b10 10 
10 NESW 1 
  28 (35) 
 
RtePM limits the evacuation duration to 72 hours after which the simulation stops. In a 
few of scenarios, some or all of the simulation runs went over this limit and, as such, the 
actual evacuation duration for those runs was unknown. The decision was made to 
exclude those scenarios from the results that exceeded 72 hours. In total, seven scenarios 




The simulation runs were used to draw various results and conclusions about the 
impact of closing different combinations of destination nodes. The purpose of these 
results was to determine if there was any compound effects from reducing the number of 
destination nodes and the inclusion of traffic incidents in the model. First, a brief 
discussion is given on the relationship between number of destination nodes and 
evacuation time. This is followed by looking at results of difference between scenarios 
runs with incidents and without. The impact on individual road facilities is shown 
followed by a discussion about the compound relationship between traffic incidents and 
destination node closures. 
A key requirement of this study was the speed of analysis. All scenarios were created 
in approximately eight hours, and each batch run, of 50 runs, took one day to complete. 
Since RtePM runs on a web-server, multiple simulation instances could be run in parallel. 
The simulation run data was exported for analysis, constituting the most time consuming 
aspect of the study.  
Each scenario was run with and without traffic incidents in RtePM. The average 
evacuation durations from these simulation runs are shown in Figure 2. The graph groups 
the scenarios by number of destination nodes available. As the graph indicates, there is a 
clear negative relationship between the number of destinations available in scenario and 
the time it takes to evacuation Washington, D.C.; the result indicate that the more 
evacuation destination nodes available, the quicker the evacuation. In the baseline 
scenario, when all destination nodes are available, the evacuation took approximately 10.5 
hours on average without traffic incidents and 11.5 hours with incidents. In the extreme 
case, the evacuation duration took seven times longer (potentially more if the evacuation 
duration could have been determined for excluded scenarios). This rapid increase of 
evacuation durations shows the importance of designating as many evacuation routes 
available as possible.  
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Figure 2. Graph Showing the Simulation Run Results Groups by Number of 
Available Destination Nodes Compared to Average Evacuation Duration 
 (in hours) for that Scenario 
The results indicate that the inclusion of traffic incident increases the evacuation 
duration of that particular scenario. To test this hypothesis, a series of Welch’s t-tests 
were conducted at the 95% confidence level, and from these results, it can generally be 
concluded that traffic incidents significantly increase the evacuation duration. The details 
of these results have been omitted in the interest of space. 
The only exception is the scenario where the East routes are closed (NSW). Given 
similar scenarios showed significant differences the NSW exception has been put down to 
random chance. This hypothesis was confirmed by completing a new set of NSW scenario 
runs. In the new results, incidents increased evacuation duration by 0.3%, significant at 
the 95% confidence level. We have included the original results in our graphs because we 
feel it is important to highlight the multiplicity problem [33], that is, when conducting a 
lot of t-tests at the 95% level we would expect 5% of them to produce a type I error. 
The next set of results focuses on the effects of the ten individual destinations nodes. 
This is done through consideration of the ten scenarios that relate to the exclusion of each 
one of the destination nodes. The impact of the destination nodes on evacuation duration 
is considered in terms of unavailability rather than availability. Individually availability of 
each destination node could not be considered due to the exclusion of some of the related 
scenarios from this analysis. Emergency managers are likely more interested in 
unavailable routes out of Washington, D.C. than available roads. The results from this 
analysis are shown in Figure 3. 
As the graph indicates, there is not much difference between the cases when the 
different destination nodes are excluded. There are noticeable peaks when parts of the I-
95 interstate facility are closed; this indicates the importance of that road as an evacuation 
route. The I-95 scenarios were one of the only single-destination node scenarios that had 
an evacuation duration of less than 72 hours. The bars of the graph are colored to show 
which cardinal direction they relate to: North (Red), East (Green), South (Blue), and West 
(Purple). The graph indicates that North is the most vital direction of the road network to 
increase the speed of an evacuation. 
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Figure 3. Graph Depicting the Scenario Evacuation Duration, with Traffic 
Incidents, when One Destination Node is Closed. The Destination Nodes are 
ordered Numerically and are Represented by their Related Road Facility 
The final piece of analysis conducted was to try to find evidence of a compound 
relationship between the traffic incidents and closure of destination routes. No evidence 
was found and thus it was concluded that there was not compound effect of these two 
types of events. Graphs where created to exemplify this lack of relationship as shown in 
Figure 4 and Figure 5. Figure 4 shows the relationship between the change in evacuation 
duration and the number available destination nodes. It was expected that a positive 
correlation would exist between these two aspects of the model, but the graphs indicates 
that is not the case. The reason for this expectation was that if an incident happened in a 
scenario where there was only one destination node, it would hold up the whole system; if 
there were many destination nodes then an incident would have less effect. Given the 
spread of results, Figure 4 indicates that other affects had a greater influence in 
determining the differences between the simulation runs with and without incidents.  
 
 
Figure 4. Graph Depicting the Relationship between the Increase in 
Evacuation Duration Due to Traffic Incidents and the Number of Available 
Destination Nodes 
It was also hypothesized that variability of impacts of traffic incidents would be greater 
in scenarios where there were fewer destination nodes; for example, if there is only one 
destination node then multiple incidents on road segments just before the end-point could 
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cause a major disruption in the evacuation duration. Figure 5 shows the relationship 
between the number of destination nodes and the normalized variance of the simulation 
runs with traffic incidents. The variances were normalized to account for the wide spread 
of average evacuation duration, i.e., 10 to 70 hours. No clear pattern was detected in the 
runs conducted. Thus, it was concluded that there does not exist a relationship between 
the impact of traffic incidents and the availability of the destination nodes. 
 
 
Figure 5. Graph Depicting the Relationship between the Normalized 
Variances of Simulation Runs that included Traffic Incidents, for a 
Particular Scenario, and the Number of Available Destination 
The results indicate that there is no compound relationship between traffic incidents 
and number of destination nodes closures on the evacuation duration. However, both 
traffic incidents and number of destination nodes do have an impact, individually, on 
evacuation duration and this should be considered by emergency management decision-
makers. In addition, the effects of failures of other critical infrastructure, like a blackout, 
could increase the rate of traffic incidents and thus the evacuation duration. 
 
6. Sensitivity Analysis and Validation 
As already mentioned, the rate of incidents was derived from national level statistics. 
However, due to rounding errors and the imprecise nature of the incident-to-accident ratio, 
this rate could have taken values within a range from 0.905 incidents per 100,000 VMT 
(low) to 1.29 incidents per 100,000 VMT (high) [29]. Washington D.C. contains a lot of 
commuter traffic and this extra traffic could also affect the results. Thus, there is a 
requirement to conduct the sensitivity analysis on both the traffic incident rates and the 
inclusion of background traffic. 
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The project team used a simple discrete approach for the sensitivity analysis. Three 
new variations were applied to a subset of the scenarios, namely: a low incident rate, a 
high incident rate, and a normal (medium) incident rate with background traffic. RtePM 
allows the users to make these setting changes in a straightforward manner. The 
background traffic considered was a high rate with an extra 75% of the demand being 
included as background traffic. RtePM incorporates background traffic as changes to the 
vehicle parameter so the background traffic is not explicitly model as new vehicles. 
 
Figure 6. Graph Showing the Number of Traffic Incident for the Different 
Scenarios Considered in the Sensitivity Analysis 
The research team conducted the sensitivity analysis on a subset of the scenarios. This 
subset were scenarios with only one exits (scenarios 1 through 10). This subset was used, 
as their original runs were the most extreme in terms of incidents and evacuation duration. 
Given that the same number of vehicles are considered in all scenarios, a reader might 
expect that the number of incidents that occur is similar for a given incident rate. 
However, this is not the case due to the different scenarios requiring the vehicles to travel 
a different number of miles. Consider the graph shown in Figure 6, it shows the results 
from the ten scenarios for the five variations on the scenarios: no incidents allows, low 
incident rate, medium incident rate, medium incident rate with background traffic, and 
high incident rate. The results indicate a ranking of the scenario variations by the order 
shown in the graph. As expected, the ranking is consistent for the low, medium, and high 
incident rate levels. However, there is a lack of consistency between whether or not 
background traffic is included. This lack of consistency implies that the total VMT in both 
cases is similar though the average speed for the case of background traffic is lower. 
Due to the extreme nature of the scenarios considered for the sensitivity analysis, i.e., 
only one evacuation destination was allowed in each, only three of ten scenarios 
completed their evacuations within the 72-hour limit. It was hoped that with the lower 
incident rate some of the excluded scenarios would show evacuation times less than 72 
hours, however, this was not the case. As such, only the three originally included single-
exit scenarios showed any meaning results in relation to evacuation time. 
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Table 3. Duration Results for the Three included Single-exit Scenarios 
 Scenario 
Average duration 
without incidents (hr) Low Medium 
Medium + 
background High 
2 49.4 5.6%* 9.6%* 12.7%* 13.5%* 
8 51.2 6.0%* 8.7%* 13.9%* 14.2%* 
9 65.1 6.8%* 8.2%* 9.3%* 8.8%* 
     * Significate at 95% confidence level 
There are several points of interest from the results shown in Table 3. Notice that 
Scenario 2 has the highest number in incidents, from figure 6, but smallest evacuation 
time. This result implies the vehicles were greatly using the faster ring road for evacuation. 
There is a significant jump in the number of incidents for Scenario 8, as shown in figure 6, 
which implies a high degree of traffic rerouting for when background traffic or high 
incident rates are considered. Finally, even though Scenario 9 has a higher evacuation 
time for background traffic compared to the high incident rate, both cases have 
approximately the same number of incidents. 
The sensitivity analysis imply that decreasing/increasing the incident rate 
decreases/increases evacuation rate and the number of incident. This result was expected. 
Including background traffic seems to have little effect on the number of incidents but 
does increase the evacuation duration. 
 
6.1. Validation 
One approach to validation is to compare these results to those from similar studies, but 
limited such information exists. This research was to demonstrate the ability to consider a 
whole host of different scenarios rapidly, which could not be done in a reasonable amount 
of time using traditional evacuation modeling, and, as such, the results from our scenarios 
do not exist in other research. To use a traditional method for determining traffic incident 
rates, for our scenarios, would require determining the curvature and other road features 
of over 100,000 road segments, which would have be a significant challenge. To the 
authors’ knowledge, no existing study exists which considers the evacuation duration 
when multiple major routes are closed down in the Washington, D.C. area. 
There has been some validation of the generic incident model, which is discussed in 
Collins et al., [29]. This validation included comparing incident rate draw from the 
California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) Performance Measurement System 
(PeMS). Our actual scenario results shown are comparable with existing studies that used 
different scenarios. For example, Robinson et al., [30] found that traffic incident affect 
evacuation duration by about 10%; the effects from our scenarios range from 1% to 14%.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper describes the demand for the rapid simulation of evacuation scenarios 
employing generic traffic incident modeling. To demonstrate practical usage, evacuation 
scenarios of the Washington, D.C. area were developed and analyzed in the Real-time 
Evacuation Planning Model (RtePM), which was adapted to include a generic incident 
model. The incident model uses the Vehicle Miles Travelled (VMT) on a road segment to 
determine if an incident has occurred on that segment. The impact of an incident is 
modeled as flow reductions. By excluding other potential factors that could affect the rate 
of traffic incidents, our generic model limits the data collection requirements of the 
potential user, making it applicable for use in a variety of different modeling situations. 
However, generic incident models are not well accepted within the transportation 
community. This is mainly due to concerns about the application to planning for road 
improvements. Emergency planners do not have the same fidelity requirements as civil 
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engineers; hence, there is a demand for a more simplistic decision-support tool for 
emergency evacuations. 
This paper demonstrates a rapid approach to modeling “what-if” analysis of evacuation 
scenarios. The RtePM tool allows decision-makers a quick and easy way to explore these 
scenarios, requiring only a web-connection and computer. The results from the case-study 
evacuation of Washington, D.C., indicate that both traffic incidents and the number of 
destination routes available effects the evacuation duration. If the number of destination 
routes available is severely decreased then the evacuation duration dramatically increases. 
This rapid information collection could help emergency managers inform senior decision-
makers about evacuation announcement timing for specific rare events. As a rule of 
thumb, the results indicate that traffic incidents increase evacuation duration by about 
10%. Most importantly, the simulation was able to run in a matter of hours, which is vital 
when time is critical factor in decision-making. 
The results from the simulation scenario analysis would be virtually impossible to get 
entirely from real-world data. This is the particular strength of rapid simulation as a tool 
to aid emergency managers as it would be virtually impossible for them to be able to plan 
for every single possible evacuation scenario with a high resolution required for urban 
planning. These difficulties are both due to time limitations and data collection 
requirements. Hence, there is a need for emergency managers to be able to develop 
quickly and analysis the results from evacuation scenarios on the fly.  
Currently, RtePM only contains data for use in the United States, though the authors 
believe that other nations could apply this approach to their own demands. The next stage 
for this project is determining how actual emergency decision-makers react to this 
approach and what improvement they think are needed. 
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